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In 1979, Thomas Jackson and Anthony Kronman asked the re- 
lated questions why debtors offered security in personal property and 
whether a security interest would increase the welfare of a debtor and 
all of its creditors, taken as a group.' These questions inspired a vigor- 
ous debate.2 The participants have taken as their starting point the 
Modigliani & Miller irrelevance proposition that if capital markets are 
perfect, information is perfect, all actors have homogeneous expecta- 
tions, bankruptcy costs are zero, and no taxes exist, a firm cannot in- 
crease its value by altering its capital structure.3 A change in the mix of 
a firm's debt, from unsecured debt to secured, is an alteration in its 
capital structure. Since such a change cannot increase the firm's value 
and since it is costly for firms to offer security, the irrelevance proposi- 
tion predicts that no secured debt will be issued. Because secured debt 
is common, participants in the "security interest debate" therefore pro- 
ceed in two ways: they relax the strong assumptions that Modigliani & 
Miller made to see whether the new models thereby obtained predict 
security, or they add additional factors-moral hazard, risk aversion, 
and the like-to see whether models so derived can explain the ob- 
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vance to security interests is found in Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle, supra note 2, 
at 1052-55, 1066-68. 
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served data. All but one of the debaters claim to have found at least a 
tentative explanation for the existence of secured debt. Although the 
details of these explanations differ, they have a common theme: secur- 
ity-the debaters claim, exists and is justified because it is efficient; that 
is, a debtor can compensate those of its creditors whose position is 
worsened by security while remaining better off than had it not granted 
a security interest. Alan Schwartz, on the other hand, argues that no 
good explanations for the presence of security exist. Thus, he believes, 
claims of its efficiency are premature. 
This debate is important for two reasons. First, personal property 
security is common. Second, if security has good effects-it reduces 
costs-the law should bless it; if security has bad effects-it exploits the 
uninformed-the law should restrict it. Hence, it is important for law- 
yers to understand the consequences traceable to the use of security in 
commercial transactions. 
Professor Homer Kripke is a new entrant to the security interest 
debate.4 His conclusion that security exists because it increases welfare 
is similar to the conclusions of other scholars, but his methodological 
stance differs sharply from prevalent current practice. Kripke rejects 
the Modigliani & Miller irrelevance proposition and the entire method- 
ological tradition from which it derives. Rather, Kripke claims, the se- 
curity interest issue should be studied with "the techniques that Robert 
Braucher and [he] applied as drafters of the present form of UCC arti- 
cle 9" and with "the kind of reasoning that [they] submitted to the 
Review Committee composed of practicing lawyers, judges, and aca- 
demics of an older generation."5 Kripke's article deserves notice because 
it attempts to change the terms in which the security interest debate 
should be conducted. His substantive explanations for the existence of 
security are also worth study because it is through them that his meth- 
odological claims are cashed out. 
Part I of this reply shows that Kripke's methodology, taken on its 
own terms, is deficient. Part II shows that his explanations for the exis- 
tence of security are incomplete or false. The lesson is that wisdom in 
result is unlikely to derive from error in method. 
I. THE KRIPKE METHODOLOGY 
Two quotes, both criticisms of Schwartz, illustrate Kripke's meth- 
4 
Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commer- 
cial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1985). 5 Id. at 932. 
[Vol. 133:987 
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR KRIPKE 
odological claims: 
[M]y strongest disagreement with Schwartz's approach is 
that he seems to consider law-and-economics research as con- 
sisting of rummaging through economic hypotheses formu- 
lated in other contexts for other purposes, in the hope of 
finding a fit for his current problem, instead of formulating 
his own hypotheses by first looking at the facts and at 
history.6 
. . . Schwartz [should have] ventured into the factual 
world by even casual inquiry to formulate a hypothesis in- 
stead of trying to adapt a theory formulated in different fac- 
tual contexts .. .7 
Actual forays into the market are necessary because scholars cannot ob- 
tain "an understanding of the business world" by "reliance on second- 
ary sources."8 Instead, Kripke believes, "research can best be carried 
out by factual inquiry among those practicing in the field"9-that is, by 
surveys of lawyers and business people.'? 
The methodological position these statements imply thus holds that 
(i) the scholar, in solving a problem, should look at the real world di- 
rectly, obtaining facts about it from its inhabitants; (ii) it is unneces- 
sary-indeed, harmful-to use hypotheses or theories "formulated in 
different factual contexts" to understand the problem at hand; (iii) 
rather, the scholar should formulate both positive and normative hy- 
potheses by observing the facts themselves. This position may have ini- 
tial appeal to persons innocent of social science methodology but is ac- 
tually without merit. The first claim is both trivially correct-look at 
the facts--and false-use only the reports of involved actors. Such re- 
ports are helpful, but they have two significant limitations: people may 
not fully understand the causes of their own conduct, and people may 
attempt to make self-description consistent with self-image, to the dis- 
service of truth. Hence, serious scholars do not advocate using only 
these reports when other data are available." 
6 Id. at 964. 
7 Id. at 969. At another point Kripke states, "I simply cannot believe that the 
study of abstract concepts developed in other contexts for other purposes can in any 
way contribute to an understanding of practical commercial law or policy." Id. at 969. 
8 Id. at 932. 
9 Id. at 983. 
10 See id. at 980. If surveys are inconvenient, commercial law scholars, Kripke 
advises, should learn about the world from participating in the American Bar Associa- 
tion and reading such journals as The Business Lawyer, The Commercial Law Journal, 
and the NCFA Journal. See id. at 984. These journals often contain articles by lawyers 
and business people. 
1 The classic book that makes this point is E. WEBB, D. CAMPBELL, R. 
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Regarding Kripke's second claim, we acknowledge that actual 
phenomena sometimes are so novel that analysts may have to formulate 
novel hypotheses to explain them. But it is only common sense to ask 
whether previous theories can illuminate the issue at hand. Secured 
lending transactions take place in markets. Jackson & Kronman and 
Schwartz "rummage through economic hypotheses formulated in other 
contexts" because these hypotheses attempt to explain how markets 
perform. Kripke's methodological claim that this search is fruitless 
would be persuasive only if he could show that the laws of market 
behavior have no application to secured lending. Kripke does not even 
attempt such a showing. Theories developed in particular contexts may 
of course lack generality, but to acknowledge this is not to consign old 
theories to the flames.l2 
Kripke's last claim, that scholars should formulate hypotheses by 
observing the facts, is also flawed. To believe that moral norms can be 
deduced from factual observation is to commit the naturalistic fallacy, 
that "ought" is deducible from "is."'3 The long-standing existence of 
secured credit does not mean that it is advantageous to society, any 
more than the long-standing existence of cartels means that they are 
socially desirable. Further, Kripke misconceives the process of hypothe- 
sis development. Scholars first formulate a tentative hypothesis to ex- 
plain a phenomenon. In formulating the hypothesis, they use the facts 
they know, though these may be known only from casual observation or 
second hand. Then they test the tentative hypothesis against observa- 
tion, refining or abandoning it as the facts dictate. Coming to the "real 
world" without a hypothesis yields only confusion because then a 
scholar has no way to choose, from among the countless facts that exist, 
those facts that could help to explain the phenomenon under study. A 
SCHWARTZ & L. SECHREST, UNOBTRUSIVE MEASURES: NONREACTIVE RESEARCH IN 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1-34 (1966). 
"s Perhaps a better way to put our point is to examine the implications of 
Kripke's rejection of "hypotheses formulated in other contexts." Theories are invented 
to solve particular problems in particular contexts. According to Kripke, scholars 
should invent new theories whenever they work in different contexts. In economics, for 
example, Cournot discovered the law of demand by speculating about the actions of 
mineral spring proprietors. See R. EKELUND & R. HEBERT, A HISTORY OF ECO- 
NOMIC THEORY AND METHOD 254-56 (2d ed. 1983). According to Kripke, economists 
should ignore Cournot and reinvent the law of demand problem by problem. It is odd, 
moreover, to view the irrelevance proposition as a "hypothesis formulated in other con- 
texts." It was formulated to explain differentiated capital structures. Such structures 
often include secured debt. 
1s See G. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 9-15 (1959). Long ago, Richard Danzig 
conclusively criticized this error in reasoning as it appeared in commercial law. See 
Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 621, 627-31 (1975). 
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hypothesis provides a basis for focusing on what in the real world is 
relevant. For example, the Modigliani & Miller irrelevance proposition 
is valuable not because its assumptions reflect the real world-they do 
not-but because the proposition orders the scholar's inquiry: which 
assumption, when relaxed, could explain how firms can increase their 
value by issuing different kinds of ownership forms-a differentiated 
ownership structure-instead of issuing claims that all have the same 
level of priority?14 The actual process of hypothesis formulation some- 
times is misunderstood because the world seems meaningful yet people 
seldom explicitly formulate hypotheses to explain it. The cognitive psy- 
chologists teach, however, that everyone uses heuristics to classify phe- 
nomena, although only some are aware of doing so."' Scholars must be 
among this latter group. Kripke's prescription for ignorance, staring at 
the facts until a hypothesis emerges, therefore is both unwise and im- 
possible to implement. 
Kripke's methodological position is so false that he himself cannot 
consistently follow it. His footnotes frequently make reference to sec- 
ondary sources,16 and he uses models and relies on concepts invented in 
different factual contexts.17 But his belief in his own position and his 
14 
Assumptions play a heuristic role in the Modigliani & Miller analysis. A heu- 
ristic assumption is made though it is known to be false because the assumption permits 
progress to be made on a problem. The scholar making the assumption intends to relax 
it after the progress has been made. Economists and natural scientists use heuristic 
assumptions. See Musgrave, "Unreal Assumptions" in Economic Theory: The F-Twist 
Untwisted, 34 KYKLOS: INT'L REV. FOR SOC. Sci. 377, 382-86 (1981). 
16 See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. 
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982); R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN IN- 
FERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980). 16 See, e.g., Kripke, supra note 4, at 932 n.15, 942 n.42, 942 nn.52 & 55, 952 
n.85. 
17 See, e.g., Kripke, supra note 4, at 952, 965-66. Kripke's attempt to describe the 
Modigliani & Miller irrelevance proposition as a "weak" analytic tool is itself weak. 
He first rejects the proposition because it fails to predict security. Yet prediction is not 
the only function of theory. See Gilson, Value Creation By Business Lawyers: Legal 
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 252 & n.32 (1984). The irrelevance pro- 
position is and from the beginning was meant to be useful as a heuristic device. See 
Musgrave, supra note 14, at 382-85; Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle, supra note 2, 
at 1052-55, 1066-68. Kripke also claims that the irrelevance proposition is weak be- 
cause it is not universally accepted. On this ground, however, his attack attempts to 
derive support principally from people working within the framework of the irrelevance 
proposition, and who do so by relaxing assumptions-the same method used by other 
participants in the security interest debate. See Kripke, supra note 4, at - & n.128. 
These sources, whether persuasive or not in the explanations they offer, attempt pre- 
cisely the interaction of theory and the real world that we advocate. The only real 
challenges to Modigliani & Miller that Kripke notes are a paper by Durand in 1959, 
Durand, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment: 
Comment, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 639 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Durand, The Cost of 
Capital], and a book by Graham, Dodd, and Cottle from 1962, A. GRAHAM, D. DODD 
& S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 320-22 (4th ed. 1962). Durand, however, is widely 
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attempts to follow it are severely handicapping. Kripke is trying to play 
tennis with a baseball bat and the results are predictable-a lot of 
swings but no points scored. 
II. KRIPKE'S SUBSTANTIVE CASE 
Kripke offers three substantive explanations for the existence of 
personal property security.18 First, security reduces the risks of credi- 
tors who take it. These creditors thus can economize on credit investi- 
gations, and consequently loan transactions proceed more quickly.ls 
Second, secured lending increases the value of a debtor's assets. There- 
fore, security does not worsen the position of unsecured creditors. In- 
deed, matters may improve for the unsecured creditors because the new 
assets may help debtors to prosper. Since security makes some better off 
and none worse off, it is efficient.20 Third, some loans will not be made 
regarded as the first person to advance what later became the irrelevance proposition, 
in Durand, Cost of Debt and Equity Funds for Business: Trends and Problems of 
Measurement, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, CONFERENCE ON 
RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE 215 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Durand, Cost of 
Debt]. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 373 (2d 
ed. 1984) (noting that Durand deserves credit for setting out the issues that Modigliani 
& Miller later solved). In that article, Durand states that the contention "that con- 
servative increases in bonded debt do not increase the risk borne by the common stock- 
holders" has "little merit; it runs counter to the rigorous analysis offered by the advo- 
cates of [what became the irrelevance proposition]." Durand, Cost of Debt, supra, at 
230. This is hardly stunning support for Kripke's suggestion that the Modigliani & 
Miller irrelevance proposition is controversial. 
18 The difficulties with Kripke's argument are revealed early in his article when 
he claims that he is asking the question that occupies participants in the security inter- 
est debate: "[W]hy should the law allow discrimination in favor of certain creditors, 
through the device of contractual security, while invalidating discrimination in favor of 
other creditors through contractual arrangement with the debtor for preferred pay- 
ment?" Kripke, supra note 4, at 965 (footnote omitted). This question is both easy and 
the wrong question. Professors Baird and Jackson have pointed out that when dealing 
with other property claimants the question Kripke puts concerns only ostensible owner- 
ship. See Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope 
of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 179-90 (1983); see also Baird, Notice Filing and 
the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1983). The key distinc- 
tion between allowing secured credit and not allowing other contractual forms of prior- 
ity in payment is that secured credit exists within a legal system designed to provide 
notice to third parties of the existence of this priority, so other purchasers of the collat- 
eral can account for the fact that "what they see" may not be "what they get." Other 
private agreements do not provide the requisite notice, and therefore generate a nega- 
tive externality. Legal bans exist, in part, to prevent such uncorrected externalities. 
Kripke's question also is the wrong one: the question that occupies participants in the 
security interest debate is whether, assuming an adequate solution to the ostensible 
ownership problem, the state's permission of secured credit advances the net aggregate 
welfare of the debtor and its creditors. 
19 See Kripke, supra note 4, at 946-49. Kripke states, "The importance of this 
point cannot be overemphasized." Id. at 948. 
20 See id. at 937-41. 
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without security, and therefore some new assets will not be acquired; 
hence, security is essential to the economy.21 Taken singly or together, 
Kripke argues, these claims show both why security exists and that it is 
good. His claims, however, are incomplete or false. 
A. Security Reduces the Secured Creditor's Risks 
No participant in the security interest debate denies that security 
reduces the risks that secured creditors face. But focusing on the obvi- 
ous reduction in the risk to one creditor is not responsive to the correct 
question: whether security reduces the secured creditor's risk more than 
it increases the risk of unsecured creditors. Unless it does, the existence 
of secured credit is at best a wash and, because of the unavoidable costs 
it introduces (such as filing and search costs), inefficient in the aggre- 
gate. Kripke, because he rejects the irrelevance proposition, ignores a 
subset of the relevant players-the unsecured creditors-and thus gives 
what is at best an incomplete explanation-that secured debt exists be- 
cause of its risk reduction properties for secured creditors. 
B. Secured Lending Increases the Debtor's Assets 
In modeling the security interest problem, Jackson & Kronman, 
implicitly, and Schwartz, explicitly, use examples that suppose a 
debtor's assets to remain constant in value from the time of credit ex- 
tension to the time of default.22 According to Kripke, only persons igno- 
rant of the "highly practical" commercial law field could use such ex- 
amples, because informed persons know that secured loans add to a 
debtor's assets and increase its earnings prospects. The unrealistic na- 
ture of the examples used by Jackson & Kronman and Schwartz, 
Kripke believes, causes them to commit the fundamental error of view- 
ing "secured credit as a zero-sum game" in which a secured creditor's 
gain is just the unsecured creditor's loss.23 Rather, because secured 
credit adds to a debtor's wealth it is a positive-sum game, creating gains 
in excess of losses for all of the players taken as a group.24 Kripke's 
knowledge of the real world, he argues, thus enables him to show the 
efficiency of the secured lending form. In contrast, the methodology 
used by Jackson & Kronman and Schwartz causes them to remain ig- 
21 See id. at 960-61. 
32 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1147-48; Schwartz, A Review, supra 
note 2, at 8-9. 
23 Kripke, supra note 4, at 936. 24 See Kripke, supra note 4, at 936-41. 
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norant of this world and so to commit fatal error.25 
Kripke's claim is confused because it conflates the question 
whether money should be borrowed with the question under what 
terms it should be borrowed.2 No one denies that a debtor can use 
borrowed funds to increase its net wealth.27 The issue is whether se- 
cured borrowing can increase a debtor's net wealth over what it would 
have been with an unsecured loan. To answer this question, the analyst 
must focus on the effect of altering the terms under which money is 
borrowed. 
A firm contemplating acquisition of a new asset faces both an in- 
vestment decision and a financing decision, but Kripke fails to keep 
these two decisions separate. Thus he repeatedly compares a debtor 
that has a new asset and a new senior secured creditor to a debtor that 
has neither. This is erroneous because the issue in contention does not 
concern the investment decision, whether to buy the asset, but rather 
the financing decision, how to pay for it. To resolve the question how 
asset purchases should be financed, Kripke should have compared a 
debtor that has a new asset and a new secured creditor to a debtor that 
has the same new asset and a new unsecured creditor. Given that this is 
the relevant comparison, however, the asset need not be new. It is nec- 
essary to do no more than Jackson & Kronman and Schwartz did, 
which was to compare the effect on a debtor's net wealth of alterations 
in the loan contracts it may make, independently of whether the loans 
themselves are used to increase the assets a debtor owns. As we shall 
next see, it is Kripke's blurring of the distinction between whether a 
firm should borrow at all and under what terms it should borrow that 
causes him to make the fundamental mistake. 
a" Kripke's focus on increases in the debtor's assets leads him to concede that some 
secured debt is inefficient. This is because he apparently believes that when the ques- 
tion is one of taking security interests in existing assets, the advantages to one creditor 
come at the expense of the other. See id. at 937. Although Kripke is speaking only of 
taking security on account of an antecedent debt, his point implicitly calls into question 
the wisdom of allowing anyone to take a security interest in existing assets. In this 
respect, at least, Kripke may be calling into question more of the structure of article 9 
than Jackson & Kronman did. For if explanations such as differential monitoring skills 
carry any force, they would apply equally to security interests in existing assets. Kripke 
dismisses the problem of taking security interests in existing assets as unimportant, 
without recognizing the damage he has done to much of his argument. See id. at 937- 
38. 
6N We discuss here the borrowing of money while Kripke focuses on the acquisi- tion of assets. These are different ways of describing the same phenomenon because 
credit enables a debtor to purchase things. We later discuss asset financing explicitly. "7 Kripke suggests that Modigliani & Miller "come close" to denying this. Id. at 
937 n.35. The irrelevance proposition, however, suggests only that theform of borrow- 
ing (debt or equity) does not matter. Our point stands: borrowing can sometimes in- 
crease net worth. 
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To perceive the effect of Kripke's error, first realize that before 
loans are made debtors possess wealth. When a particular debtor bor- 
rows a sum without security it has a new asset-the borrowed funds or 
what they purchased-and a new liability. The debtor also has an al- 
tered prospect of future success. The debtor's creditors, including the 
creditor who made the loan at issue, have claims on the debtor's new 
and old wealth and on its prospects. In the event of default the credi- 
tors' claims will be satisfied on a pro rata basis. Next suppose that the 
same sum is borrowed with security. Neither the debtor's net wealth 
nor its prospects are changed from what they would have been had the 
loan been unsecured, for the debtor is helped by the money, not the 
mortgage. What has changed is the configuration of claims to the 
debtor's wealth and prospects: the secured lender now has a prior claim 
to the extent of its loan. As Part IIA above and much previous work 
has shown,28 given the assumptions that Modigliani & Miller make the 
consequent lower interest rate the secured creditor charges will be offset 
exactly by the higher interest rates of the debtor's other creditors, who 
will adjust to the presence of security. Hence, security seemingly pro- 
duces no net gains for debtors.29 The scholarly task, then, is to show 
that the apparent offset is not real-that a mere alteration in the con- 
figuration of claims to the debtor's wealth and prospects actually can 
generate net credit cost reductions. That borrowing money to use in a 
firm's business can increase the debtor's wealth is both true and irrele- 
vant to this task. Kripke, however, uses only the wealth-increasing 
properties of borrowing to explain the existence of security. It is this 
conflation of the question whether to borrow with the question whether 
to mortgage that is the real error, for it causes Kripke to believe that he 
has solved the problem of why security exists when he has in fact made 
no progress. The following discussion of Kripke's major example fur- 
ther illustrates this basic point. 
Kripke sets up a balance sheet30 of a debtor that looks like this at 
28 See supra note 2. 
29 A proof of the proposition that security cannot increase net wealth even when 
the prospect-increasing property of new credit is explicitly considered is on file with the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 
30 See Kripke, supra note 4, at 938-39. 
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time 1: 
Balance Sheet 1 
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth 
Cash $20,000 Unsecured Creditor A $40,000 
Auto Repair 
Equipment 80,000 Owners' Equity 60,000 
TOTAL $100,000 TOTAL $100,000 
The debtor then buys an inventory of automobiles and starts to market 
them, borrowing the money on a secured basis, yielding at time 2 the 
following balance sheet: 
Balance Sheet 2 
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth 
Cash $20,000 Unsecured Creditor A $40,000 
Inventory 60,000 Secured Creditor B 60,000 
Auto Repair 
Equipment 80,000 Owners' Equity 60,000 
TOTAL $160,000 TOTAL $160,000 
Kripke draws the following conclusion from this: 
[W]hen security is taken for new consideration, the pool of 
assets available for the unsecured creditors is not necessarily 
diminished. The old unsecured creditors have not given up 
any claim to assets on which the new secured creditor has a 
security interest, because the old creditors had no claim to 
the assets until the debtor negotiated to obtain them by meet- 
ing the supplier's terms. The new creditor furnished addi- 
tional assets in return for the security.31 
Kripke admits that the increased leverage increases the risk of Creditor 
A "somewhat," because "if the new assets prove insufficient to satisfy 
the debt to B, then B will attempt to recoup this deficiency by compet- 
ing with A for the remaining pool of assets."32 But he apparently be- 
lieves that he has shown that this increase in risk does not offset the 
benefits of permitting Creditor B to have priority with respect to the 
31 Id. at 939. 
82 Id. 
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new asset.33 
He has, however, shown nothing of the sort.34 First, assuming the 
asset would be acquired without security, and absent explanatory fac- 
tors (such as differential monitoring skills or specialization), the exis- 
tence of security alters only priorities, nothing more. If Creditor B wins 
with respect to the asset, Creditor A clearly does not. Thus, a world 
that allows Creditor B to take a security interest necessarily increases 
the risk to Creditor A, an increase that interest rates will reflect. Also, 
if the debtor plans to borrow again, future creditors will be disadvan- 
taged by the security and so will charge higher interest rates to offset 
any possible earlier gains. 
C. Without Security Some Assets Will Not Be Acquired 
Kripke claims that without security assets often would not be ac- 
quired. Since new assets increase wealth and since loans with security 
make their acquisition possible, security is efficient. This claim cannot 
show that security is desirable. There is a distinction between acquiring 
the asset and the way in which it is acquired. The legal world places a 
number of constraints on the agreements that creditors and debtors can 
reach. For example, a deal to give a particular creditor priority without 
public filing is prohibited because it is disadvantangeous to other credi- 
tors, even though the creditor seeking the secret priority would not sell 
the asset without it. Similarly, to say that creditors will not finance 
asset purchases without security cannot be grounds for permitting se- 
curity unless it is also shown that security is desirable (or at least not 
bad). The question posed by the Modigliani & Miller irrelevance prop- 
osition is whether security, with notice, is in that same category of 
things that should be prohibited even though particular creditors might 
desire them, because they are detrimental to all creditors taken as a 
group. Kripke ignores this point. Thus, his claim that security is good 
S3 See id. at 940. If Kripke had made such a showing, he would have disproved 
Durand, on whom he relies. See Durand, Cost of Debt, supra note 17, at 228-31. 
34 Moreover, as Jackson & Kronman observed in their 1979 article, Kripke's 
"new asset" world is not nearly as clear-cut as this. Any new loan (viewed from the 
moment after the loan is made) increases a debtor's assets (as well as its liabilities) by 
the amount of the loan. But not all new loans should be purchase money. The question 
is why limit purchase money priority to identifiable assets. Jackson & Kronman sug- 
gested the answer had to do with the nature of debtor misbehavior and the possibility 
that the proceeds of general loans might be frittered away, ultimately leaving a new 
liability but no corresponding asset. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1164-78 
(expanding on that rationale). In exploring that question, these authors felt compelled 
to attempt an answer to an even more basic one: why a "first in time" rule? In answer- 
ing that, they were led back to the question: why security at all? See id. at 1178-82. 
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because without it some loans would not be made is unpersuasive.38 
Further, as shown above, under certain assumptions secured loans 
are more costly to debtors than unsecured loans. Then there seemingly 
exists a loan contract without security that would make both the debtor 
and the (otherwise) secured creditor better off; these parties could split 
the cost savings that forgoing security makes possible. Hence, the ana- 
lyst's task is to show why such contracts are sometimes not used. But to 
show this is to show why security is used. Therefore, Kripke's claim 
that security is efficient because it makes possible some credit exten- 
sions merely restates the major positivist question: why do the parties 
agree to security? It does not answer this question. 
Kripke attempts to respond to this last difficulty by claiming that 
sales financing without security would have to be done with higher in- 
terest rates but that higher interest rates and increased collateral re- 
quirements are not perfect substitutes. Put more simply, he asserts that 
creditors, whether sellers or third-party financers, will not eschew se- 
curity in favor of higher rates. Consequently, the loan contract without 
security described in the previous paragraph will never be seen in the 
real world; debtors will acquire assets in secured lending transactions 
or will not acquire assets at all. This response is unsound because it 
implies that the granting of a security interest is a necessary condition 
to the acquisition of an asset. Kripke acknowledges that much un- 
secured trade credit and other credit exists, however, and this credit is 
often used to purchase assets.36 Since, as Kripke asserts, unsecured 
loans are more risky than secured loans, the creditors in these un- 
secured financing transactions must regard higher interest rates as sub- 
stitutes for security.37 Kripke's claim can be rescued by being restated: 
in some cases, higher interest rates and security are not substitutes. But 
36 Kripke's claim that if the creditor wants something as a condition of a sale, the 
state should permit it, provides no basis to separate out the demand for security from 
the demand for purchase money priority. Curing ostensible ownership does provide 
such a basis, but when that response is offered we no longer are in a world of giving 
the creditor what it wants, but rather a world of imperfect information with attempts to 
correct the imperfection. Kripke gives no reason why his claim cannot, and should not, 
apply as well to an instance in which a creditor will not extend credit unless it is given 
priority without public filing. Yet Kripke has indicated that he would not advocate 
abolition of the public filing requirement even if credit would not otherwise be ex- 
tended. See Kripke, Book Review, 37 Bus. LAW. 723, 728 (1982) (reviewing B. 
FRITCH & A. REISMAN, EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING (2d ed. 1980)). 
s6 See Kripke, supra note 4, at 972-73, 981-82. 
37 See id. at 972-73. Another way to put the point in the text is to observe that 
sellers will always sell for cash. Since the financing could come from someone other 
than the seller, to say that without security an asset will not be acquired is thus to say 
that no one will finance asset sales on an unsecured basis. As the text shows, however, 
much unsecured financing exists. 
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then Kripke must identify these cases. He makes only one effort, in a 
footnote, to explain why creditors will not raise interest rates: "many 
secured lenders may prefer not to be known as interest gougers."88 This 
effort is unavailing for two reasons. First, it adds very little to our un- 
derstanding of when creditors will reject more money in favor of more 
security just to say that "many" creditors will reject more money. Sec- 
ond, if secured credit cannot increase a firm's value and is costly to 
obtain, debtors may prefer higher interest rates to security. A desire to 
retain good will thus may cause lenders to eliminate security rather 
than require it. 
To be sure, lenders sometimes will not raise interest rates in re- 
sponse to increases in debtor demand, even when usury statutes would 
permit the higher rates. Efforts to explain this behavior, however, do 
not lend support to Kripke's position. There now are two partially con- 
flicting explanations of voluntary limits on rate increases. Both posit an 
information asymmetry between debtors and creditors. Credit investiga- 
tions, it is assumed, do not fully inform creditors of each debtor's char- 
acter and prospects. Hence, creditors face uncertainty. One story then 
seeks to explain the existence of credit rationing-the existence of an 
excess demand for loans in equilibrium.39 According to this story, lend- 
ers forgo rate increases because of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection exists because debtors who are willing to pay higher 
interest rates may, on average, be worse risks; they are willing to pay 
high rates because they perceive their probability of repaying loans to 
be low. Therefore, to raise rates in response to increases in demand 
could cause borrowers to select adversely against lenders: good borrow- 
ers go elsewhere and bad borrowers take the higher rates. Similarly, 
moral hazard-bad behavior after a loan is made-exists because rais- 
ing the interest rate decreases the return on successful projects. This is 
said to induce debtors to pursue projects with lower probabilities of 
success but with higher payoffs when success occurs. As a result of ad- 
verse selection and moral hazard, creditors will not raise interest rates 
monotonically in response to demand; rather, there exists an equilib- 
rium interest rate that maximizes creditor profits while leaving some 
loan demand unsatisfied. Credit is rationed. 
This theory also claims that creditors will not increase collateral 
requirements in response to debtor demand.40 Adverse selection is 
38 Id. at 955 n.95. 
89 See Stiglitz & Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 
71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981). 
40 See id. at 402-06; see also Ordover & Weiss, Information and the Law: Evalu- 
ating Legal Restrictions on Competitive Contracts, AM. ECON. REV., May 1981, at 
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claimed to explain this phenomenon. Wealthier persons are less risk 
averse than poorer persons, and wealthier persons can put up the most 
collateral. Also, debtors may be able to meet collateral requirements 
because they earned higher returns on prior risky investments, so that 
those debtors with substantial collateral are just those debtors with high 
preferences for risk. Hence, increasing collateral requirements may, 
under plausible conditions, increase the number of risk takers in a pool 
of potential borrowers sufficiently to lower a creditor's return from 
what it would have been with lower collateral requirements. If, there- 
fore, credit rationing explains the failure of creditors to raise interest 
rates in response to demand, then one is left without an explanation for 
security; when creditors will not raise interest rates, they also will not 
demand security. 
The second explanation for why creditors sometimes will not just 
increase interest rates also cannot provide an efficiency justification for 
security. This explanation posits the same information asymmetry just 
described, and also assumes that the costs to debtors of granting security 
interests vary inversely with the quality of their loan projects. Then 
debtors with good projects will offer more collateral as security than 
debtors with bad projects. Debtors, that is, use security as a device to 
signal to creditors their creditworthiness, and creditors rely on these 
signals because they are otherwise imperfectly informed about the debt- 
ors.41 This theory thus claims that more security is offered by low-risk 
than by high-risk debtors, while the previous theory claims the reverse. 
With matters in this state, empirical verification or more theory is 
badly needed, but having either is unlikely to sustain Kripke's view. As 
we have seen, if the rationing theory is true, security is unexplained. 
And if the signaling theory is true, claims for the efficiency of security 
are premature. As has often been shown, signaling equilibria are not 
necessarily efficient, nor have any efficiency properties been associated 
with a security interest signaling equilibrium.42 
To summarize, Kripke's claim that security is desirable because 
without it much asset financing would not occur is defective on both 
normative and positive grounds. That some creditors insist on security 
cannot of itself demonstrate the normative value of secured lending. Al- 
though increased interest rates seem at first blush good substitutes for 
collateral requirements, explanations for why they sometimes are not 
399, 401 (1981) (papers and proceedings). "4 This explanation was first suggested in Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 
14-21. A similar version is in Chan & Kanatas, Asymmetric Valuations and the Role 
of Collateral in Loan Agreements, 17 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 84 (1985). 
42 See Schwartz, A Review, supra note 2, at 14-21. 
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good substitutes in actual markets have yet to demonstrate the efficiency 
of secured credit. 
CONCLUSION 
The novelty of Professor Kripke's entrance into the security inter- 
est debate lies in his claim that security interest problems should be 
analyzed with the tools and evidence available to practicing lawyers. It 
is doubtful whether practicing lawyers are as badly handicapped in 
performing intellectual tasks as he asserts, but it is easy to see that 
Kripke's methodology is utterly bereft of serious intellectual support. 
No one could get a challenging problem of social policy right using 
Kripke's approach. Unsurprisingly, his claims to explain security are 
hackneyed-lenders will not lend without security because security 
reduces their risks-or confused-security rather than credit itself in- 
creases the assets of the debtor. Regardless of the description under 
which these claims fall, they do not advance understanding of the secur- 
ity interest problem at all. Kripke's unfortunate failure to take the the- 
oretical literature seriously has prevented him from using his vast expe- 
rience to shed real light on the issues he addresses. Operating in a 
vacuum of theory is a weak way to demonstrate that others have oper- 
ated in a vacuum of fact. 
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